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Valdes* The deaths of two US citizens and the capture of a third by the Sandinista army in a contra
supply plane shot down in southeast Nicaragua last Sunday were expected casualties of the type
of US presence in that "undeclared" war. The fighting between the contras and the Sandinista
army has often been portrayed as a land war. However, the deployment of a contra air force is
both necessary to the survival of the rebels, and is central to the strategy of the CIA. CIA strategy
in Central America is not new. In Southeast Asia as well as Cuba, the Agency essentially relied on
planes to keep anti-government guerrillas supplied. Again, such tactics are not novel: if a guerrilla
army can be supplied by air, it is freed from reliance on a local population that often cannot be fully
trusted. Moreover, if the guerrillas do not establish stable control over a given territory (such as in
the case of the Salvadoran rebels), they cannot grow their own food. Thus, a weak point of "nomadic
guerrillas" is their supply network. Nomadic guerrilla bands have three options to obtain supplies.
First, they can simply seize food and other necessities by force from the population in the locales
where they are active. This option, however, hardly wins hearts and minds. Second, the guerrillas
could establish over-land supply lines. Supply lines of this type are problematic if the guerrillas
must be on the move. In the case of the Nicaraguan contras, as they penetrate deeper into Sandinista
territory, the supply line becomes longer and consequently, subject to more numerous attacks.
The third option is the one chosen by the CIA, that is, airlifting supplies to the guerrillas wherever
they happen to be. Considering the Nicaraguan contras' reliance on airlifted supplies, the greater
the number of contras in Sandinista territory, the greater the number of unidentified incursions
into Nicaraguan air space. On March 6, 1985, the Nicaraguan Ministry of Defense reported that
from January 1 to March 1 of that year, the Sandinistas had detected 23 unidentified flights over
national territory from Costa Rica alone. In early 1985, the Sandinista armed forces were unable
to do much about the incursions. Since then, they have acquired sophisticated helicopters and
surface-to-air missiles. Of course, the Sandinistas are unable to select air drop locations, and they
usually occur in isolated regions lacking any manner of roadways. Another aspect of the air war
in Nicaragua is the continual reconnaissance flights over or near Nicaraguan territory since 1983.
For instance, the WASHINGTON POST reported on 4/27/84 that "US reconnaissance planes have
been flying regular missions over Nicaragua and occasionally have been fired on from the ground..."
The flights over Nicaragua were described as part of an intense program of reconnaissance flights
from the Palmerola air base in Honduras and Howard air base in Panama. About six planes flied all
night, "every night," to gather intelligence for US personnel in Honduras, and to provide tactical
support for the contra leadership, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), also based in Honduras.
FDN leaders then pass the intelligence on to task force commanders inside Nicaragua. Intelligence
gathering by air provides the contras with a comparative advantage over the Sandinista forces,
since the latter do not possess comparable equipment and sources. Due to the high altitude flying
of reconnaissance planes, the Nicaraguan military has not been able to effectively deter this type
of espionage. Finally, another part of the contra air war is concerned with actual military attacks on
Nicaraguan targets. For these missions, the CIA apparently contracts US civilians, both to provide
air support to the contras and for training purposes, who may have been associated with the agency
in the past. Two incidents in 1984 illustrate this dimension of the air war. On Feb. 2, 1984, two
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CIA-directed air strikes were reported against a Nicaraguan radio transmitter and military camp.
The CIA was assisted by specially trained Latin Americans in these missions. According to the
NEW YORK TIMES (5/3/84), the "air attacks were planned and supervised in Honduras and El
Salvador by Americans working for the CIA." Next, the CIA directed an attack on a Nicaraguan
military training school in Santa Clara, near the Honduran border on Sept. 1, 1984. In this attack
two Americans Dana H. Parker Jr., police detective from Huntsville, Ala., and James Powell, 3rd, a
part-time flying instructor from Memphis, Tenn. were killed flying a UH500 helicopter provided
to the contras by the CIA. The helicopter apparently flew over the site before three twin-engine
Cessna O2As arrived on the scene. The Cessnas were piloted by contras, who fired rockets on
the military base. Of the 14 planes brought down by the Sandinista army since late 1983 (see "14
Planes Shot Down by Nicaraguan Army in Past Three Years: A Chronology," this issue), most were
engaged in airlifting supplies to the contras, and in military attacks on Nicaraguan targets. Both
activities have been reported on numerous occasions to be under the direction of the CIA or under
CIA contract. At this time, the number of aircraft involved in all three aspects of the contra air war
is unknown. Private right-wing groups in the United States have raised large sums of money to
purchase aircraft for the contras. On occasion, the Defense Department has managed to circumvent
the law by "donating" aircraft to the FDN. The CIA has also been involved in directing the use of
Salvadoran air bases and planes, as well as bases in Honduras and Costa Rica for supply drops
inside Nicaragua. Assuming that at least 2000 contra troops are on missions inside Nicaragua,
keeping them supplied would require a fleet of small planes, in addition to respective pilots, co-
pilots, mechanics, airstrips, and so forth. One obvious way of hiding this activity is for the planes to
depart from airstrips near the Nicaraguan border where military exercises are usually underway.
The US-built Aguacate air base in Honduras is one such base among others. The US presence in the
Nicaraguan conflict can readily be seen in the air war as opposed to the ground war. It follows that
we can expect American casualties in the context of the air war. US mercenaries would experience
difficulties trying to survive inside Nicaragua over a long period of time, not to mention that the
possibility of capture hinders their cause. More importantly, however, serving as a pilot for the
contras is a temporary arrangement. Flying a contra mission can often be completed in a few hours,
providing the pilots and crew with adequate time to enjoy the nightlife of San Jose or Tegucigalpa.
An added attraction of participating in the air war against Nicaragua is that airplane crew members
get paid in person. In contrast, foot soldiers ("grunts") may never know if their families are receiving
checks for their services. [Prof. Valdes teaches in the sociology department at the University of New
Mexico, and is director of the Latin America Data Base (LADB). The CAU and another electronic
newsletter, the Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, are publications of the LADB.]
-- End --
